早在 6 月，美国总统唐纳德・特朗普签署与伊朗的谅解备忘录时，就做出过一系列令人警惕的预判。
特朗普在法国七国集团峰会的新闻发布会上表示：“我们的石油储备大约只能维持四周。”
他预言，石油储备耗尽会引发社会大混乱。他还担心自己会被拿来和赫伯特・胡佛对比 —— 这位共和党总统任期内遭遇市场崩盘，进而引爆大萧条。
特朗普绝不想落得和胡佛一样的评价。
但他随后撕毁了这份谅解备忘录，再度对伊朗发起打击，霍尔木兹海峡再度被封锁。那么，特朗普 6 月所预言的混乱局面距离现在还有多远？
我采访了 CNN 商业频道资深记者戴维・戈德曼，伊朗战争爆发以来，他一直跟踪石油及原油市场动态。
戈德曼表示，美国用于应急的战略石油储备正在不断消耗，俄克拉荷马州小镇存放的商业原油库存同样持续走低。不过市场并未陷入恐慌，一个特朗普不愿接受的现实，或许就摆在他眼前。
以下为经过篇幅编辑整理后的访谈实录。
沃尔夫： 谅解备忘录已经作废，停火协议也不复存在。那场大混乱真的要来了吗？
戈德曼： 只是时间早晚的问题。目前有两件事延缓了危机爆发。
第一件事：霍尔木兹海峡曾短暂恢复通航三周，此前被困在海峡内超 2 亿桶原油几乎全部运出。这笔供给折算下来，为市场争取了约 17 周的缓冲时间，帮特朗普争取到喘息窗口。
第二件延缓经济灾难的因素，正如特朗普也曾提到的，就是中国。
战前中国的石油储备规模超出所有人预期，无论是远见使然还是运气因素，中国手握超 10 亿桶原油库存。如今中国正在动用这批储备来满足国内用油，消耗规模远超外界预估。
中国的储备还能支撑多久？最乐观的估算为三至四个月，但外界无法掌握确切真实数据。
沃尔夫： 那美国还能撑多久？
戈德曼： 目前美国是全球遥遥领先的第一大产油国。
单纯自给自足层面，美国完全可以满足本国石油需求。美国日产原油约 2100‑2200 万桶，国内消耗量仅 1300‑1400 万桶。产量远大于消耗，美国已经成为石油出口国。但问题在于原油大致分为两类。
美国产出的是轻质低硫原油，十分适合炼制汽油，但其他用途有限。如果要生产沥青，以及部分柴油、航空煤油，就必须从中东进口原油。
重质高硫原油的另外两大来源是委内瑞拉和俄罗斯，而这两个地方当前局势都十分动荡。
还有一个现实：中东原油供应中断之后，中东原油最大买家，也就是亚洲、欧洲、澳大利亚，都开始转向采购美国石油。大量美国柴油流向亚洲，航空煤油输往欧洲，这就挤压了留给美国国内的燃料供给。 停火之后局势已经发生改变
沃尔夫： 霍尔木兹海峡再度封锁。原油会不会再次大量积压，是否再来一次停火就能继续争取缓冲时间？
戈德曼： 如今困在海峡内的原油规模已经和之前不一样。不再是数亿桶，仅为数千万桶。就算再次解封波斯湾，也不会有巨量原油一次性涌入市场。
另外，红海现在也遭遇封锁。沙特原本有一套应对方案：把原本经波斯湾外运的原油，通过输油管道向西输送到红海，再经由曼德海峡运往印度以及亚洲客户。但伊朗支持的也门胡塞武装，如今也封锁了曼德海峡。 危机更多体现在燃料端，而非原油本身
戈德曼： 现在还出现了此前未曾凸显的炼油危机。战争期间，伊朗摧毁或重创中东地区 30 座炼油厂。根据损毁程度不同，恢复生产需要数周、数月，甚至数年时间。
同时俄罗斯也持续遭受乌克兰无人机袭击。俄罗斯此前承担全球 12% 的柴油出口，如今受炼油设施损毁影响，已经没有柴油对外出口。
中国对国内炼油厂实施管控，一方面源于需求变化，另一方面也为推进机动车电动化。
面对全球巨大的燃料需求，美国正开足马力炼油。但美国多地反复遭遇热浪，高温会干扰蒸馏工序，给炼油冷却环节带来巨大压力。 战略石油储备设施老旧残破，库存已经处于极低水平
沃尔夫： 设立战略石油储备，本意就是为应对这类供给冲击。我们需要认清哪些现实？
戈德曼： 上世纪 70 年代美国爆发真正的石油危机：民众要在加油站排队数小时加油；全国限速 55 英里以减少油耗；还实行车牌奇偶号分日加油。形势十分严峻。
应对手段之一就是在墨西哥湾沿岸建设战略石油储备，未来再遭遇危机时，可以动用储备，降低对中东、伊朗石油的依赖。
储备原油储存在地下巨型洞穴储罐，分布在路易斯安那州与得克萨斯州，地下罐体高度相当于两座帝国大厦。但设施修建于七八十年代，虽然国会多次拨款翻新，整体依旧老旧。
储备的实际可用油量存疑，存在泄漏风险。还有物理层面难题：储罐底部堆积大量油泥沉淀物，当库存水位下降，就算账面显示还有 3 亿桶原油，受沉淀物影响，实际可抽取使用的可能仅有 1 亿桶。
沃尔夫： 普遍观点认为全球储备何时会真正耗尽？
戈德曼： 特朗普政府的战略石油储备采用 “先抛售、后续回购补库” 的合约模式。库存降到约 2．75 亿桶就会停止释放，开始回购补库。除非出台新政策，否则库存不会进一步跌到 1．75 亿桶。
但这套模式有几个隐患。 第一，现在回购原油的价格很高。 第二，如果遭遇飓风或者其他突发危机，即便少量补库，储备规模也达不到应急需要。 第三，战争有可能无限期延续，霍尔木兹海峡持续封锁。持续向市场投放储备原油，掩盖了战争对燃料价格的真实冲击。
沃尔夫： 为什么商业原油库存的问题更加严峻？
戈德曼： 美国输油管网的枢纽是俄克拉荷马州库欣。得克萨斯、墨西哥湾出产的原油汇集于此，这里形成基准油价，再输送到全国各家炼油厂。库欣库存，是石油行业判断美国供油安全的核心指标。
行业临界压力线是 2000 万桶。低于这个数值，抽取原油就要额外耗费大量设备。目前库欣库存为 1860 万桶。业内专家测算，库存跌到 1400‑1500 万桶区间，就会很难从储罐抽出原油。
可以类比咖啡机保温桶：龙头位置不在最底部，存量低的时候，靠重力已经流不出咖啡，需要倾斜容器。油罐底部沉积大量油泥残渣，这部分完全无法使用。即便依靠泵强行抽取，大部分也是废料。我们现在距离这个临界点已经很近。
沃尔夫： 2 月 27 日开战前，原油价格不到 70 美元一桶，如今大约 84 美元。后市如何看待？
戈德曼： 油价走势就像过山车。这里指布伦特原油，开战前 70 美元，冲高突破 113 美元；6 月霍尔木兹海峡短暂开放，油价一度跌回开战之前；随后再度反弹破百，现在回落至 80 美元区间。
市场之所以反复摇摆，是因为战争期间全球石油需求大幅萎缩，全球日均减少约 1300 万桶的石油消耗。6 月谅解备忘录生效、大量原油重回市场时，市场甚至消化不掉这些供给。中国减少采购，很多亚洲国家找到了替代供油渠道。这场危机戏剧性地从全球巨大石油短缺，迅速演变为局部供给过剩。
市场带着一种 “和平预期”：市场相信特朗普表态，他会不惜一切打通霍尔木兹海峡，很快有望达成新协议。交易者不想押注在持续暴涨行情上。
值得注意的是，油价从未触及 2022 年高点。当年俄乌冲突，俄罗斯减少 300 万桶日供给，布伦特原油突破 120 美元一桶。而本次危机的供给缺口数倍于当年，油价却没有到达该位置，也没有触及 2008 年接近 150 美元的历史高点，当时缺口约 1000 万桶。
这足以说明市场的态度：市场相信特朗普，认为一旦海峡重开，市场原油供给足以满足需求。 市场普遍相信局势终将得到解决
沃尔夫： 市场愿意给予他这份信任，是相信他本人，还是他已经退无可退？
戈德曼： 一方面，特朗普多次宣称谈判即将达成，最后却落空，本不该轻信他。但只要有一次兑现 —— 也就是此前短暂打通霍尔木兹海峡的那份协议，就足以改变交易逻辑。假如你押注油价涨到 90 美元，结果市场跌到 70 美元，就会承受巨大亏损。
这就是即便特朗普在伊朗战争谈判上过往记录糟糕，市场依旧倾向抱有期待的原因。
另一方面，结束战争完全符合特朗普的诉求：政治层面、经济层面、财政层面都有强烈动机。开战至今，市场始终判断，特朗普更倾向于结束冲突，而非无限度耗下去。
伊朗才是最大的不确定变量。伊朗未必希望海峡保持开放，延续冲突对它有利。所以核心不在于市场信不信任特朗普，而在于市场如何判断伊朗的选择。 当下阵痛，或许会带来长期格局改变
沃尔夫： 有哪些出路？
戈德曼： 关键在于什么方案是各方可以接受的。冲突本质的矛盾是伊朗要收取过海峡通行费。谅解备忘录第五条约定，60 天内船舶可以免费安全通行霍尔木兹海峡。但伊朗解读为：所有船只必须向伊朗政权登记，未来就要征收通行费；而特朗普政府坚持，这属于国际水域，伊朗无权收费。于是伊朗开始袭击绕行阿曼海岸、避开海峡的过往船只。
很少被人讨论的一条路径：允许伊朗收取通行费。我并不是说这是绝佳方案，但这是可行路径。伊朗拿到通行费，掌握海峡话语权；美国则保障原油正常进出。油价可能因此上涨一两美元，但如果市场认定整体原油供给充足，这点涨幅甚至可能被消化。
沙特已经找到了绕开海峡的办法，未来还会有更多国家修建管线。雪佛龙就计划修建伊拉克直通地中海的输油管道。从长远来看，这场战争会削弱霍尔木兹海峡在全球石油市场中的地位，这算是危机带来的意外收获。 摆在特朗普眼前的解决方案
沃尔夫： 这个长期利好的看法过于乐观。短期来看，等于美国主动吃亏，还变相壮大伊朗，而美国的目标本就是削弱伊朗实力。
戈德曼： 这确实是一种观点。但现实已经摆在眼前。即便特朗普幻想拿到一份比奥巴马时期更好的协议，这个目标并不现实。
出路其实就在眼前，只是他过于固执。6 月促使他签署谅解备忘录、避免类似大萧条级别的经济灾难的判断，虽然有些极端，但危机临界点并非遥不可及，风险会再次降临。
想要避免灾难，适度对伊朗让步，换取海峡重新开放，借这次危机降低全球对霍尔木兹海峡的依赖，或许就是他想要的胜利，只是需要承受短期代价。
Trump predicted an oil catastrophe if the war didn’t end． The clock is ticking
Back in June， President Donald Trump justified the signing of amemorandum of understandingwith Iran by making some alarming predictions．
“We run out of reserves at about four weeks，”Trump saidduring a press conference in France at the Group of Seven summit．
Running out ofoil reserveswould cause “bedlam，” he predicted， saying he feared being compared to Herbert Hoover， the Republican president who presided over a market crash that led to the Great Depression．
Trump does not want to be compared to Herbert Hoover．
But he also abandoned the memorandum of understanding and is againattacking Iran． The Strait of Hormuz is again closed． So how far off is the “bedlam” Trump predicted in June？
I spoke with David Goldman， a senior reporter for CNN Business who has focused on oil and oil markets during the war with Iran．
He told me the strategic reserve of oil maintained by the US in case of emergencies is dwindling． So are commercial reserves kept in a small town in Oklahoma． But markets are not freaking out because the answer， which Trump won’t like， may be staring him in the face．
Our conversation， edited for length， is below．
Does Trump’s prediction still hold？
WOLF： The MOU is off． The ceasefire is off． Is bedlam coming？
GOLDMAN：The question is when． There are two things that are happening that have staved off the bedlam．
The first is that we had a three-week reopening of theStrait of Hormuz， and just about all the oil that had been locked in the Strait of Hormuz， to the tune of over 200 million barrels， got out． Do the math and you’re at around 17 weeks of supply． That bought Trump some time．
The other thing that has staved off economic catastrophe， I think， and Trump also said， was China．
China has surprised everyone byhow much oilit had in reserve before the war． Whether it was prescient or good luck， China had more than a billion barrels of oil sitting in stockpiles， and it’s been drawing down those stockpiles to fuel its oil needs more than you would think．
How much longer can China hold out？ The best estimates are like three to four months， but we don’t really have a clear insight．
WOLF： How much longer can the United States hold out？
GOLDMAN：The US is the largest oil producer in the world by far．
In a vacuum， the United States can support its own oil needs． It is producing something like 21 or 22 million barrels of oil a day， and we consume somewhere around 13 or 14 million barrels a day in this country． We have millions of barrels a day more that we produce than we consume， and so the United States has become an exporter of oil． The problem is that there are two kinds of oil， broadly speaking．
We produce what is called light sweet crude oil， and that’s really good for making gasoline and not much else． So if you want to make other stuff — asphalt， or even to an extent， diesel and jet fuel — we need to bring in oil from the Middle East．
The other place to get heavy sour crude， which is the second kind of oil， is from Venezuela． You knowwhat’s going on there．And then the third is Russia． You knowwhat’s going on there．
The next thing that we need to understand is that because the Middle East isn’t producing all this oil， the biggest customers of the Middle East， namely Asia and Europe and Australia， are demanding oil from the United States． A lot of our diesel is going to Asia． A lot of our jet fuel is going to Europe， and that has reduced the amount of fuel and oil that we are able to provide our own country．
Things have changed since the ceasefire
WOLF： The Strait of Hormuz is closed again． Is the oil backing up in such a way that another ceasefire can buy more time？
GOLDMAN：One thing is that there’s less oil inside the Strait of Hormuz right now than there was before． We don’t have hundreds of millions of barrels right now； we have tens of millions of barrels that are stuck inside． So there’s not a massive amount of oil that’s ready to come out of the Persian Gulf this time around．
The second thing is that there is now also a blockade happening in theRed Sea． Saudi Arabia was really effective in piping oil that normally would have gone out through the Persian Gulf westward through its pipelines to the Red Sea， and then exiting the Red Sea for its customers in India and Asia via the Bab-el Mandeb Strait． The Houthis （Iran-backed rebels in Yemen） have now blockaded that Strait as well．
It’s a fuel problem more than an oil problem
GOLDMAN：The other thing is that we’re in a refining crisis now that hadn’t really existed before． Part of the reason is that Iran has either decimated or significantly impaired 30 refineries around the Middle East during the course of the war． It will either take years or weeks or months， depending on the destruction， to get those back online．
Russia has also been bombarded with drone strikes from Ukraine， and so Russia， which was exporting 12% of the world’s diesel， is now exporting no diesel because they don’t have the refining capacity to do it．
China has placed restrictions on its refineries， in part because of demand， but in part because it’s trying to increase electrification efforts of its vehicles．
The United States is going all out to refine as much as it possibly can because there’s so much demand for US fuel． Well， we’ve been in a heat wave off and on in the United States， and that’s really bad for refining because you need to cool the fuel through the distillation process．
The Strategic Oil Reserve is old， rickety， and very， very low
WOLF： We’re supposed to be prepared for shocks like this through theStrategic Petroleum Reserve． What should people know about that？
GOLDMAN：In the 1970s， there was an oil crisis in this country — a true oil crisis， where people were lined up at gas stations for hours． The country had to restrict the speed limit to 55 to reduce the amount of oil that we were using． You couldn’t get gas if your license plate ended in an even or an odd number， depending on what day of the week it was． It was really serious．
One of the solutions was to build a Strategic Petroleum Reserve along the Gulf Coast， so that if we ever had a similar situation， we could draw from that and not rely as much on Iran or the Middle East．
It exists in in caverns． There are underground reserves or tanks． Some of them are in Louisiana， some in Texas． And they are massive， twice as tall （underground） as the Empire State Building． But the problem is that they were built in the ‘70s and ‘80s， and although Congress has， over the course of time， ordered a renovation of the facilities， it’s pretty old． It’s not totally clear that all the oil that we put in it remains in it． There may be some leaks． One of the concerns is that as you drain it， physics might not allow you to pump out all the oil that’s sitting in there because the sediment at the bottom is like gunk at the bottom of the tank． So when you say you have 300 million barrels， you may only have 100 million usable barrels．
WOLF： What is the conventional wisdom about when worldwide reserves really start to fail？
GOLDMAN：The way the SPR works is that the Trump administration basically has a contract where it says we will sell this oil and we will buy back this amount of oil at a later date． So we will get to a level where it’s going to be around 275 million barrels， and then the drain will stop， and then we’ll start to replenish it． And so we’re not really going to approach 175 unless there’s another action that we take．
There’s a few problems with that．
One， we’re buying back at pretty high prices．
The other thing is that if there’s a hurricane or some emergency where we need to use it， even refilling it a little bit isn’t going to get us to where we need to be．
The third problem is that there’s a potential for this war to go on indefinitely， and the Strait of Hormuz is closed indefinitely， and the drawdown in the SPR has been disguising the seriousness of the war and its effect on fuel prices by continuing to kind of flood the market with oil．
WOLF： Why are commercial stockpiles the bigger issue？
GOLDMAN：America’s pipeline network comes to a hubCushing， Oklahoma． That’s where all Texas oil， Gulf Coast oil gets piped into． The price is set there， and then it’s piped out to the country’s refineries． The stockpiles in Cushing are the measure that the oil industry looks to to understand the health of America’s oil supply． The operational stress level where physics starts to take over and you need to do extra work to get the oil out the pipes is 20 million barrels． Cushing is currently at 18．6 million barrels． Experts who understand this stuff way better than I do believe that somewhere between 14 and 15 million barrels is where you literally cannot get any oil out of the Cushing reserves．
Think of it like a hotel or restaurant coffee urn． You hit the spigot， which is close to the bottom， and the coffee stops dripping out． What do you do？ You tip it toward you， and it starts coming out a little bit． At some point， just like with that coffee urn， gravity is no longer able to push the oil out， and there’s gunk like sludge sitting at the bottom of the tank． Can’t use that． The spigot level is not at the very bottom of the tank． You can use pumps to force some of it out， but a lot of that is unusable． We’re pretty close to the unusable．
Demand for oil has fallen dramatically during the war
WOLF： Oil was less than $70 a barrel before the war on February 27． It’s about $84 today． What do we expect from the market？
GOLDMAN： If you’re a fan of roller coasters， this has been the most wild ride that you could possibly take． Oil went from $70 before the war — and I’m talkingBrent crude numbershere — to above 113． We went all the way back down below the level at which we started in June when the Strait of Hormuz opened， and then we went all the way back up to $100， and now we’re in the $80 range again．
Why can’t the market figure this out？ First of all， demand for oil has plunged during the course of this war． We’ve basically figured out a way to live without 13 million barrels of oil a day． And when that oil started to come back into the market in June， during the memorandum of understanding， the market didn’t really know what to do with it． It didn’t necessarily even want that oil． China is not buying． A lot of Asian countries have figured out other ways to get oil or to get around it． What was astonishing is we went from the world’s largest oil supply crisis to an oil glut very quickly．
The market understands that and has what I would call a peace bias， where it believes because Trump has said that the Strait of Hormuz needs to open up， said we will get it open come hell or high water， and said we could have another deal fairly soon， it doesn’t want to be caught holding the bag． Oil， astonishingly， never approached the high that it hit in in 2022， and that’s astonishing because Brent （in 2022） hit over $120 a barrel because Russia had taken 3 million barrels off the market when it attacked Ukraine．
We had multiple times that amount in this crisis， and we never even approached that price． It also never approached the high that we hit in 2008 of close to $150 a barrel， when we had about 10 million barrels of oil that that we had lost． So this is a huge statement from the oil market that they believe Trump， and they think that there’s enough oil on the market to satisfy demand once the strait opens．
Markets seem to think this will get solved somehow
WOLF： That’s pretty incredible that he commands that faith in the market． Is that because his they trust him or because his back is against the wall？
GOLDMAN：One way to look at it is that no one should believe anything Trump says because you knowhow many timeshe says we’re close to the deal and we didn’t have a deal． But then， there was that one time he said we were close to the deal and we really did have a deal， or an agreement， that opened up the Strait of Hormuz for a few weeks． So all he needed to do was be right once， and then if you had thought oil should be at $90， and then all of a sudden oil’s trading at $70， you’re in a real bind．
Traders work on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange （NYSE） on July 23 in New York City． Spencer Platt／Getty Images
That’s part of the reason why， despite his very poor track record of making accurate statements about the war and the negotiations with Iran， the market is inclined to believe．
The second thing is that Trump has every incentive to end this． He has a political incentive． He has an economic incentive． He has a financial incentive． Markets， for as long as this war has lasted， have believed that that Trump is more inclined to get out of this than to stay in it．
Iran is obviously the X factor． Iran might not want the Strait to stay open， and has every incentive to keep this going， and that is the trick here． It’s less about does the market believe Trump than does the market believe Iran．
There could be a long-term benefit in the pain right now
WOLF： What are the ways out？
GOLDMAN： The question is what is the acceptable solution． What this is all about right now isIran charging tolls． This is basically a war over a tollbooth because the MOU’s fifth clause said that Iran would allow for the safe passage of ships through the Strait of Hormuz for 60 days toll-free． Iran interpreted that as “all ships need to register with the regime for the purpose of eventually charging tolls，” and the Trump administration has said， “That’s unacceptable． This is international water， and you can’t do that．” And so Iran started attacking ships that were using this other way out of the strait， around the coast of Oman．
The solution that few people are talking about is， well， why don’t we just let Iran charge tolls？ I’m not suggesting that that’s a great idea， but it is a path． It does give both sides what they want， where Iran gets to charge the tolls and gets control of the Strait of Hormuz， and the Trump administration gets the oil to go in and out of the strait． Yeah， it might add a buck or two to the price of oil， but in the grand scheme of things， if the world believes that we’re in an oil glut， it might not even notice that． Currently， Saudi Arabia has found a way around the situation， and others may build pipelines too． We’re talking about Chevron building a pipeline directly from Iraq to the Mediterranean Sea． Down the road we may benefit from this war because it will reduce the importance of the Strait of Hormuz to the global oil market．
The solution may be staring Trump in the face
WOLF： That long-term benefit idea seems very optimistic， since in the near term it will be a huge own goal for the US that enriches Iran at a time when the US was supposed to be making it less powerful．
GOLDMAN：That’s certainly one view． Another way to look at it is that we’re in this situation now， regardless of if Trump believes that he can get a deal that was better than the Obama deal，he’s mistaken．
The way out of this may be staring him in the face， and his resistance may be overly stubborn． His analysis of the economic situation in June that led him to the belief that he needed to sign that memorandum of understanding to avoid an economic catastrophe on the scale of the Great Depression may be extreme， but not so far off that the tipping point won’t happen again． To stave that off， giving in a little to Iran to get the Strait of Hormuz open again to have a long term good of de-emphasizing the Strait of Hormuz maybe the win that he’s looking for． It will just take some time．
